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Two important determinants of crime rates in economic theories
of crime are deterrent eﬀects and legal income opportunities. For at
least two reasons, youth crimes do not ﬁt into this picture since: 1)
most youths do not work 2) deterrent eﬀects, in terms of punishment,
are non existent or reduced for youths. Understanding the processes
behind youth crimes is important for the reduction of crime both in
the short and the long run. This paper explores the role of public
spending on youths and crime rates. Using a panel of 261 Swedish
municipalities the eﬀects on four crime rates of leisure related munic-
ipality expenditure and municipality expenditure on upper secondary
school are explored using non-linear ﬁxed eﬀect models. The main
ﬁndings of the paper are: 1) there exists statistically signiﬁcant ef-
fects of the two types of spending on crime rates 2) there is a trade
oﬀ between ﬁghting diﬀerent crimes, i.e. spending that reduces one
type of crime might increase another type 3) the eﬀects diﬀer, both
in direction and magnitude, between diﬀerent types of municipalities,
e.g. rural vs. urban 4) the eﬀects are not constant, but rather increas-
ing/decreasing in spending level.
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Thinking of public spending and crime, expenditure on law enforcement
and the judicial system is perhaps what comes into mind ﬁrst. And in-
deed Becker’s (1968) seminal paper, introducing crime into modern economic
analysis, deals with the issues of optimal law enforcement and punishment.
However, there are several other plausible channels through which public
spending can aﬀect crime rates, both in the short run and in the long run.
This paper considers public spending on schooling and leisure activities, and
the eﬀect on crime rates.
Crimes committed by youths pose interesting questions in the light of
empirical studies and economic theorizing of crime. Much of the economics
literature on crime takes its departure in "crime as work"-models, where
crime is essentially seen as employment, and competes with legal employment
for the use of time (for a seminal contribution see Ehrlich 1973). However,
most youths do not work; in Sweden there is compulsory school attendance
for nine years (up to the age of 16), and many stay in school for another
couple of years at upper secondary school.1 Youths hence face a somewhat
diﬀerent choice than adults, as they allocate their time between school, leisure
activities, criminal activities, and, for some older youths, work. This opens
up a broader policy arena, where policies can be directed towards crime.
One important aspect of economic theories of crime is the deterrence
eﬀect that the judicial system provides. When an individual commits a
crime there is a risk that he/she gets caught, which will entail some sort
of punishment, e.g. a ﬁne or incarceration. The punishment will induce a
cost, which will lower the potential payoﬀ from a crime making crime a less
attractive activity. The deterrence eﬀect for youths might however not be as
strong as for adults. For individuals under 15 years of age in Sweden there
is no direct deterrent eﬀect since they cannot be prosecuted (Clevesköld and
Thunved 2001). Furthermore, imprisonment of oﬀenders between the age of
15 and 17 should in practice not be common, and between the age of 18 to
20 prison time should be reduced compared to older oﬀenders. Even though
there exist some empirical evidence from the U.S. that young individuals are
just as responsive to punishment as adults (Levitt 1998), the desirability of
harsher punitive policies against young individuals can be questioned, giving
greater importance to preventive policy measures.
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive rela-
tionship between criminal activity in young years and adult years (see for
1In year 2000 about 77 percent of all individuals between 16 and 19 attended up-
per secondary school (The web site of the Swedish Association of Local Authorities,
www.svekom.se)
1example, Kalb and Williams 2002, or Williams and Sickles 2002). This re-
lationship implies that policies that reduce youth crime might be important
policy instruments for reducing future adult crime. Hence, it is important to
understand how diﬀerent types of policies, including public spending, aﬀect
youth crime.
One can imagine at least two diﬀerent levels where public funds can be
spent. First, at a micro/individual level, i.e. by providing incentives directed
towards speciﬁc individuals. Early interventions and support in cases where
a youth is considered to be in the habit of becoming a career criminal, for
example. Second, at a macro/community level, e.g. by providing a social
environment that oﬀers alternative activities to crime. Even though it might
be possible to identify individuals who are in a high risk category of commit-
ting crime, it would be near to impossible to predict the criminal behavior of
low risk individuals, which still can answer for a large portion of the crimes.
This situation makes the macro/community level interesting.
Using a panel data set covering 261 out of Sweden’s 290 municipalities
for the years 1998 to 2001, this paper examines the eﬀects of municipality
spending on upper secondary schools and leisure related spending on crime
rates. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section a broad picture
is given over the criminal activity of youths in Sweden. In this picture youths
are overrepresented in terms of persons found guilty and persons suspected
of committing crimes. This picture leads to the conclusion, with some reser-
vations, that a large share of crimes originates from youths. Section three
discusses the literature concerning the topic. The economics literature is
quite thin on the topic, but the sociological literature oﬀers some theoretical
background on why the types of spending considered in this paper might
aﬀect youth crime. The empirical model used is presented in section four,
and section ﬁve presents the data. Section ﬁve also discusses data quality,
an issue which is important when considering crime statistics. Section six
presents the estimation results and as we shall see there is some evidence of a
relationship between the spending types used here and crime rates. Finally,
section seven discusses the estimation results and concludes the paper.
2 Youths and Crime: Some Figures
In this section the sub population of interest here, youths, will be described
and their criminal activity will be brieﬂy discussed. Most ﬁgures presented
will be for the year 2000, but any given year covered in the analysis later
would give a similar picture. As will be discussed more thoroughly in sec-
tion ﬁve, crime statistics must be interpreted with care since the nature of
2the phenomenon of crime aﬀects the quality of the statistics gathered. The
statistics do not measure the true criminal activity, but rather the amount
that is recorded. The magnitude of the measurement error varies over time,
space and type of crimes. Answering questions about crime is therefor a risky
business that calls for great caution. However, diﬀerent types of statistics
might still provide an overview of the situation.
In Figure 1, the age distributions of persons found guilty of various crim-
inal oﬀences in year 2000 are displayed. The statistics show the principal
oﬀence, i.e. the most serious oﬀence if they were convicted of more than
one crime, of persons found guilty. Noting that only about seven percent of
the total population were between the ages 15 and 20 we can conclude that
they are overrepresented for all crimes displayed 2. Almost 20 percent of all
persons found guilty of any oﬀence this year were youths.
Going into more detail we can see that the proportion of youths increases
for several crimes. For all Penal Code crimes the share increases to around
30 percent.3 A ﬁgure that carries over to the sub groups of Crimes against
Life and Health (e.g. murder and assault), and Theft, Robbery and Other
Crimes of Stealing. The majority of persons found guilty of Crimes against
Life and Health is found guilty of assault, where youths account for just above
30 percent. Disaggregating the second group of crimes even further we can
see that for robbery and vehicle theft youths dominate with just above and
below 60 percent, respectively. Another major crime category where youths
are grossly overrepresented is Crimes of Inﬂicting Damage (e.g. vandalism
and graﬃti) with about 50 percent of all the persons found guilty. For drug
crimes we are back at 20 percent.
However, interpreting these ﬁg u r e sa st h et r u ep i c t u r eo ft h ea g ed i s t r i -
bution of all criminal activity is a risky venture. For this picture to carry
over to all criminal activity we must assume that the risk of getting caught
and found guilty is the same regardless of age and the same regardless of, for
example, what type of robbery one commits. Even though this might seem
as a reasonable assumption it might be as with most things; practice makes
perfect, and then youths are more likely to be caught and found guilty. On
t h eo t h e rh a n d ,o l d e ri n d i v i d u a l sw h i c ha r ek n o w nb yt h ep o l i c ea sc r i m i n a l s
might be more likely to be discovered if they commit crimes. Furthermore,
youths move around in a more controlled environment, e.g. school, which
increases the risk of detection and commit crimes in groups (Coleman and
Moynihan 1996). The latter have been shown to increase the risk of detection
2In year 2000 there were in Sweden 612,829 persons between 15 and 20 out of a total
polpulation of 8,882,792. (Statistic Sweden’s web site, www.scb.se)
3For speciﬁc details of the Penal Code, see Ministry of Justice (1999).
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Figure 1: Age distribution of persons found guilty of criminal oﬀences, by
principal oﬀence, 2000. Total number of persons in parenthesis. (Source:
Table A1)
and apprehension. We also have to keep in mind that we are looking at the
principal oﬀence of persons found guilty. This may distort the picture some-
what. For example, crimes of inﬂicting damage, expect of gross oﬀences, have
a narrow range of punishment, and is therefore seldom the principal oﬀence
if committed together with another oﬀence. However, we can conclude that
of all the persons found guilty of criminal oﬀences a disproportionate share
is youths, which at least indicates that youths account for a signiﬁcant share
of certain criminal activities.
The statistics over persons suspected for diﬀerent crimes let us in more
detail consider which crimes youths are involved in, i.e. typical youth crimes,
since the registration is more detailed. However, how we deﬁne a typical
youth crime aﬀects the results. The crimes most often committed by youths
are diﬀerent type of burglaries, inﬂicting damage, and petty theft (National
Council for Crime Prevention 2001). But these crimes are also among the
most common adult crimes. Crimes where youths are dominating among the
oﬀenders are auto theft, bag snatching and robberies of individuals. In Figure
2, the age distributions of persons suspected of various criminal oﬀences are
4displayed for the year 2000.
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Figure 2: Age distribution of persons suspected of criminal oﬀences, 2000.
Total number of persons in parenthesis.(Source: Table A2)
The percentage of persons suspected for any crime is a bit larger than for
persons found guilty for youths, and a bit smaller for all Penal Code crimes.
For Crimes against Life and Health the percentage is about the same for
suspected as for found guilty. However, if we disaggregate these crimes we
can see that youths have a smaller share in deadly violence, with less than
20 percent of the persons suspected of homicide, manslaughter or deadly
assault. Turning to the more common crime of assault we can see that the
percentage increases to above 30 percent for youths. Among assault, assault
against men are the most common and here youths account for just above
40 percent. Going even further down we can see that assault against men
where the oﬀender is unknown to the victim constitutes the majority of the
cases of assault against men. For this category of crime youths constitute an
even bigger share of the suspected oﬀenders.
Crimes of Inﬂicting Damage is a common crime among youths as we can
see in the ﬁgure. Just below 40 percent of all suspects are youths. Turning to
the speciﬁcc r i m eo fG r a ﬃti we can see that almost 85 percent of all suspected
5oﬀenders are youths. And, ﬁnally, for drug crimes we see that we have the
same percentage youths as for persons found guilty, about 20 percent.
Figure 3 displays the age distributions of persons suspected of criminal
oﬀences against chapter 8 of the Penal Code; Theft, Robbery and Other
Crimes of Stealing. As we can see in the ﬁgure the majority of suspects for
robbery and gross robbery are youths with over 50 percent. More than half
of these suspects are suspected of robberies of individuals, and for this crime
youths account for just above 60 percent.
Turning to burglary we can see that the majority of suspects of burglaries
committed at schools, libraries and similar venues are youths with almost 60
percent. This share decreases for burglaries at industrial premises, construc-
tion sites and similar venues and are lowest for burglaries into private houses
with about 25 percent. The same picture carries over to theft and petty theft
from diﬀerent venues. For theft from schools, libraries etc., youths consti-
tute almost 75 percent of the suspects, whereas only about 15 percent of the
suspects of thefts from industrial premises and construction sites are youths.
Of all the suspects of auto theft around 45 percent are youths, while for the
more uncommon moped theft, more than 65 percent are youths.
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(294)
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Figure 3: Age distribution of persons suspected of Penal Code chapter 8
oﬀences, 2000. Total number of persons in parenthesis. (Source: Table A2)
6Table 1: Juveniles’ participation rates in diﬀerent crime related activities.
Results from three self-report studies
Boys Girls
1995 1997 1999 1995 1997 1999
Theft related 73.0 67.1 65.5 58.9 55.5 52.1
Violence related 29.8 23.5 27.9 11.4 9.7 10.3
Inﬂicting damage related 53.14 7 . 54 4 . 03 7 . 73 1 . 42 9 . 4
Drug related 9.1 9.6 10.8 7.3 7.2 7.7
Source: National Council for Crime Prevention (2000)
There are other sources of crime statistics than the oﬃcial statistics. A
series of self-report studies were made in Sweden during the 1990’s where up
to about 6,000 pupils in grade nine (most of the respondents where 15 years
old) were asked diﬀerent questions about criminal activities (for details see
National Council for Crime Prevention 2000). In Table 1 some of the results
are reproduced. Participation rates in diﬀerent criminal activities are higher
for boys than for girls. Furthermore, a majority of the respondents reported
that they had participated in some sort of theft related activity, where theft
from school and stores are the most common, with participation rates around
70 percent for boys and around 55 percent for girls. For the other categories,
we can see that the participation rates are lower for both boys and girls, with
less than 10 percent for drug related activities in most years. Vandalism con-
stitutes the biggest share of activities related to inﬂicting damage, whereas
carrying a knife is the most common reported violence related activity. Even
though the quality of the data can be questioned, we can certainly conclude
that criminal activity is fairly widespread among the respondents4.
We have seen that youths are overrepresented in the oﬃcial crime statis-
tics, both regarding persons found guilty and persons suspected of crimes.
The reason for this might be measurement errors, a question we will come
back to in section ﬁve, or simply that they commit more crimes than adults.
That there is some degree of bias in the statistics, unfavorable for youths, is
reasonable to assume, but that all overrepresentation is due to measurement
errors is highly unlikely. Furthermore, from the ﬁgures presented here we
cannot tell anything about the criminal activities of individuals under the
a g e1 5 .P e r s o n su n d e rt h ea g eo f1 5d on o te n du pi nt h es t a t i s t i c so fg u i l t y
or suspected oﬀenders since they cannot be prosecuted. If they were to be
included, the share of youths would become larger.
4For a discussion of self-report studies, see Coleman and Moynihan (1996).
73 Public Spending, Youths, and Crime
In Sweden, the municipalities have the main responsibility for local leisure
related policy areas. However, this local responsibility rests on a voluntary
basis and is not determined by law. The most important areas are sport
and youth policies. Even though voluntary, most municipalities have similar
policies, which include support to local sports clubs and other clubs, in terms
of both cash grants and subsidized venues. The rules for eligibility for this
support varies between municipalities, both in terms of ages and activities
(Swedish Association of Local Authorities 2001).
Besides supporting the local clubs, most municipalities have complemen-
tary leisure policies, which have developed over time into providing a large
variety of activities, e.g. youth centers, youth cafés, concerts, providing ac-
tivities outside the established club structure (Swedish Association of Local
Authorities 2002). A ﬁnal important aspect of the leisure policies are the
supply of venues for sports and other activities, which is a main responsibil-
ity for the municipalities. The supply of activities and how much resources
that are spent diﬀers among municipalities.
Another important area of public spending on youths is school expendi-
ture. By law, the municipalities have the sole responsibility for the school
system (Skolverket 1997). Within the objectives and framework established
by the Government and the Parliament, the individual municipalities deter-
mine how its schools are run. This includes the resource allocation between
the diﬀerent parts of the school system.
For all students that have completed the 9 year compulsory school, the
municipalities are by law obliged to oﬀer upper secondary schooling, which
is voluntary for the students. Most of the upper secondary schools are run
by the municipalities, but there is a growing number of independent schools
and some county run schools. The cost per student diﬀers among municipal-
ities, to some extent dependent on what type of programs that are oﬀered
(Skolverket 2002). The major part of the costs is teaching costs, followed
by venue costs, textbooks and teaching aids, and, ﬁnally, a small fraction is
school meals and student well being.
An interesting question is whether or not there are any relationships be-
tween these expenditures and the crime rates in the municipalities. There
is a vast literature, both theoretical and empirical, containing contributions
from many disciplines, on the determinants of crime. We will here brieﬂyd i s -
cuss some of the economics and sociological literature relevant for the issue
studied here.5
5See for example Entorf and Spengler (2000) for a survey of the literature.
83.1 The Literature
The literature discusses at least three channels through which leisure and
school activities might aﬀect crime in the short run. First there is an inca-
pacitation eﬀect, which is the time use aspect of participating in diﬀerent
activities. While engaged in leisure and school activities, youths’ time is
occupied and cannot be spent committing crime. The second channel is
through the interaction with other individuals, which can both increase and
decrease crime. The last channel is the increase in crime opportunities that
a r i s ew h e nm o r ea c t i v i t i e st a k ep l a c ea w a yf r o mh o m e .T h e s et h r e ec h a n n e l s
are more or less emphasized in diﬀerent strands of the literature and come
in diﬀerent guises.
The incapacitation eﬀect and the interaction with other individuals, al-
though in the form of supervision, are highlighted in social disorganization
theory (STD) (Sampson and Groves 1989). According to SDT, crime is a
result of undesirable developments at the community level . When a commu-
nity’s structure cannot, due to disorganization, realize the common values of
the residents and maintain social control, crimes occur. The structure of the
community consists of social networks, both formal and informal, and the
collective supervision that the community directs towards local problems.
In this structure there are three diﬀerent dimensions where the community
can intervene to gain social control. The ﬁrst one is the ability to supervise
and control teenage peer groups. Examples of this are supervised leisure
activities for youths and intervention in street-corner congregation. The sec-
ond dimension is informal local friendship networks. When residents form
local social bonds they can easier recognize strangers and act as guardians
against crime. Furthermore, the networks also provide constraints on delin-
quent behavior of residents in the community. The last dimension is the rate
of local participation in formal and voluntary organizations. The eﬀorts to
solve common problems and socialize youth against delinquent behavior are
to a large extent dependent on the communities organizational base. The
success of such eﬀorts depends on the communities ability to encourage high
rates of participation in formal as well as voluntary groups.
The sources of social disorganization are hypothesized to be ﬁve factors:
socioeconomic status, resident mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, family disrup-
tion, and urbanization. Communities with low economic status lack funds
and resources, and will therefor have a weaker organizational base than higher
status communities. High residential mobility disrupts the forming of local
networks of social relations. Ethnic heterogeneity also impedes the forming
of networks by hindering communication and patterns of interaction. Fam-
ily disruption decreases informal social control at the community level. A
9two parent household is assumed to provide more guardianship and supervi-
sion, both of their own children and property as well as for general activities
in the community. The level of urbanization aﬀects the social control by
weakening the local kinship and friendship networks, and by impeding social
participation in local aﬀairs.
The time use aspect of criminal activity is also present in much of the eco-
nomic literature where "crime as work"-models are frequently used. However,
as noted in the introduction, most youths do not work so thinking of criminal
activity as an alternative to legal work is not appropriate for this subgroup.
The choices facing youths are more elaborate; school, leisure, criminal ac-
tivity and for older youths, work. Leung (2002) presents a time-allocation
model for these choices. Through the process of social capital accumulation,
i.e. productive resources accumulated by an individual through participa-
tion in activities that develop strong social networks, diﬀerent institutions
and environments aﬀect the individual’s time allocation choices.
In the model, time is allocated between the four diﬀerent activities in an
expected utility framework. The individual maximizes the utility received
from the returns of the diﬀerent activities: working gives wages, doing crime
produces some loot, and school increases the future wages. The maximization
is done under the uncertainty whether or not the individual gets caught doing
crimes. If caught a penalty is received, which besides a ﬁne or the cost of
incarceration, which give rise to the usual deterrence eﬀects, could include a
non-pecuniary cost the individual imposes on himself.
In the model time spent on crime, work and school are assumed to gen-
erate activity speciﬁc capital, which among other things aﬀect the returns
from spending time on diﬀerent activities. Participation in and the quality
of institutions or networks, such that school, market work, church, family
and peers, that improve school and work capital formation reduce the time
spent on crime. Delinquent peers promote the accumulation of crime speciﬁc
capital and increases time spent doing crimes.
The idea that social capital or the interaction with other individuals can
serve as a deterrent is stressed in social control theory (SCT). SCT takes
deviant behavior for granted and does not ask why individuals commit crime,
but rather why individuals refrain from criminal activity (Matsueda 1989).
Individuals refrain from criminal activ i t yb e c a u s et h e yh a v eab o n dt os o c i e t y
and therefore conform to the legal code. The strength of the social bond
diﬀers between individuals, explaining why some commit more crime than
others. Individuals compare costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent alternative actions,
and choose those that are most likely to maximize their pleasure (Hirschi
1986). The strength of the social bond, the social control, aﬀects the costs of
deviant activities, such as committing crime. The bond’s strength depends on
10four intertwined factors: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief.
Attachment to others, e.g. parents, peers, and teachers, aﬀects the weight
put on negative reactions to criminal behavior when calculating the costs of
an action. Commitment to conventional activities, such as education, raises
the cost of criminal behavior. The larger investment that is made in conven-
tional activities, the more is there to loose by criminal behavior. Involvement
in conventional activities limits the time that can be spent contemplating and
committing crimes. And ﬁnally, belief in conventional norms and values dis-
suades an individual from behavior against these norms and values. The
higher value these four factors attain the more likely it is that an individual
conclude that the cost of committing a crime is too high and refrains from
committing it.
Diﬀerential association theory (DAT) also holds the interaction with peers
and family as important factors determining crime (Matsueda 1982). In a
modern heterogenous and segmented society there exists conﬂicting deﬁni-
tions about appropriate behavior. The process of learning these diﬀerent
deﬁnitions, ’diﬀerential association’, takes place in intimate personal groups
through interactions. Favorable and unfavorable deﬁnitions, for law viola-
tions, are given diﬀerent weights depending on frequency, duration, priority
and intensity. Deﬁnitions that are presented more frequently, earlier in life
and from a more important source is given more weight in the learning pro-
cess. An individual becomes a criminal if there is an excess of favorable (for
law breaking) deﬁnitions. Thus, peer and family interactions play a central
role in DAT, but these are not always crime decreasing. Structural condi-
tions, such as class, age, sex and family status aﬀect the criminal activity by
determining the exposure to diﬀerent deﬁnitions.
The above mentioned theories are either stressing factors associated with
incapacitation and social interaction. However, an alternative approach is
criminal opportunity theory (COT) (Miethe, Hughes, and McDowall 1991).
COT focuses on conditions that have to be fulﬁlled for a crime to take place,
rather than why individuals commit crime or what motivates them. A crimi-
nal act has three minimal elements that must be fulﬁlled for it to take place; a
likely oﬀender, a suitable target, and the absence of capable guardians against
crime (Cohen and Felson 1979). All these three elements must converge in
time and space for a crime to take place.
Conventional activities aﬀect the probability of convergence. Activities
may take place at home, in jobs away from home, and in other places away
from home. Changes in activity patterns away from home increases the crime
rate because they either increases the exposure to motivated oﬀenders, in-
creases target attractiveness, or decreases the guardianship (Miethe, Hughes,
and McDowall 1991). Exposure to crime refers to a targets visibility and ex-
11posure to risky situations and locations. Target attractiveness is deﬁned both
in symbolic and material value to the oﬀender. And guardianship refers to
the ability to prevent crime from taking place.
3.2 School, Leisure, and Crime
Let us turn back to the question, posed in the beginning of this section; of
whether or not there are any relationships between leisure and school ex-
penditures and the amount of crime committed in a municipality. At the
individual level, participation in leisure activities and commitment to school
c a nh a v eac r i m er e d u c i n ge ﬀect, both by taking time from the individual and
by increasing the cost of committing crime through social interactions. How-
ever, spending time in school and at leisure activities with delinquent peers
c o u l dh a v eac r i m ei n c r e a s i n ge ﬀect. At the municipality level, the ability
to organize youths in organizations and activities could be an important fac-
tor to socialize youths and to control youths’ behavior. But we have also
seen that increased participation in activities away from home could increase
crime by providing more opportunities for crimes to take place.
Public spending on school and leisure activities could aﬀect the amount
of crime. Starting with school activities there are many possible factors
that determine how much time youths spend at school activities; for ex-
ample, parents and peers can be assumed to play important roles. How
much time that is spent on school is also a function of the juveniles mo-
tivation/commitment/involvement. It is plausible that public spending on
schools, e.g. remedial teaching, counselors, number of teachers per student,
class size, venues, home-language instruction, aﬀects the motivation of stu-
dents and their time spent doing school work.
Turning to leisure activities we can think of several activities, e.g. par-
ticipating in sports, playing an instrument, staying at home watching TV or
playing computer games, involvement in organizations and political parties,
more or less organized activities in youth recreation centers etc., that might
s e r v ea sm e a n i n g f u lw a y st os p e n dt i m e . W ec a nc a t e g o r i z et h ea c t i v i t i e s
into activities supervised by adults and activities unsupervised. For the is-
sue considered here, supervised activities are perhaps the important ones,
since public funds can be spent on these and hardly on computer games.
Preferences about leisure activities are for sure diverse, some individuals
might enjoy sports others prefer to hang around at a youth recreation center.
Whether or not an individual participates in an activity will depend on sev-
eral factors; peers, parents and the cost of participating, for example. The
likelihood of participating in any legal activity ought to be increasing in the
number of alternatives at hand and decreasing in the cost of participating.
12Al o c a ls u p p l yo fm a n yd i ﬀerent activities at low cost might therefor increase
the number of individuals participating in legal activities. Furthermore, a
local public supply of infrastructure for activities, e.g. sports centers and
other venues, is a prerequisite for the presence of many diﬀerent clubs and
activities. Furthermore, public spending in form of for example grants and
subsidies for diﬀerent activities helps funding many activities.
Thus, there might on theoretical and intuitive grounds be both positive
and negative relationships between spending on school and leisure, and crime.
4 Empirical Model and Estimation Technique
We are interested in explaining the variation in crime rates across time and
space, i.e. how diﬀerent variables aﬀect the crime rates. Assuming that
there is an underlying process that connects per capita crime rates, C,a n d
diﬀerent observable variables, x, such that
C (x,β0)=e
xβ0
where we are interested in estimating the parameter vector β0. Since crime
rates are non-negative, the exponential form is suitable. Furthermore, for
the exponential form, any changes are proportional to the crime rate, i.e.
∂C
∂x = β0C, which seems more plausible than for example constant changes
produced by a linear relation.
The crime rate in a municipality is also determined by unobservable fac-
tors, α, constant over time and possibly correlated with the observable vari-
ables. Furthermore, the crime rate can also be aﬀected by disturbances, u.
Thus, we have the following relationship between the crime rate in munici-




where µi = eαi, which is a permanent scaling factor of the municipality
crime rate, and vit = euit is the disturbance term. Furthermore, equation
(1) is recognizable as the log-linear ﬁxed eﬀect model often estimated in the
literature (see for example Levitt 1998, Nilsson and Agell 2003, Entorf and
Spengler 2000).
The true crime rates are unobservable, but we can observe the number
of reported crimes in each municipality and calculate an approximation of
the crime rate. The crimes are discrete events and the number of crimes
committed/reported are integers. This will give rise to problems, which must
be considered (see Osgood 2000, for a discussion in a cross-sectional setting).
13For larger populations, the crime rate estimates will be fairly ﬁned grained.
For a population of one million, one additional crime corresponds to 0.1
crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. However, for smaller populations the dis-
crete nature of the crimes will transfer to the crime rates. For a population of
5,000, one additional crime corresponds to 20 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants.
Since, the precision of crime rate estimates depend on the population size, we
cannot expect the variance of the regression errors to be homoscedastic if we
estimate equation (1) with common methods. The smaller the population,
the larger the variance. However, we can employ methods that are robust to
heteroscedasticity.
Another problem is that the lowest possible crime count, zero, and the
corresponding crime rate of zero will be more common and a more natural
outcome when the population sizes are small. This is especially true if we are
studying speciﬁc crimes at a disaggregated level of the data. The censoring
will cause the error distribution to become skewed, and a normal or sym-
metrical distribution cannot be assumed. Furthermore, the log-linear model
cannot accommodate the zeros without tampering with the data, such as
adding a small positive number to the zeros.
Another solution besides tampering with the data is to aggregate the units
of analysis or the crime categories such that a continuous approximation will
suﬃce and zeros will not be a natural outcome. However, in doing so lots of
interesting questions are removed from the domain of answers. Yet another
solution is to apply a method that can accommodate the nature of the data.
As we shall see in the next section, many of the Swedish municipalities are
rather small and for some crime categories of interest, the crime counts are
small and zero is a fairly common observation. Hence, there is a need to have
a model that can handle these features of the data.
The Poisson distribution is useful for modelling non-negative integer out-
comes. Let cit be the observed crime count in municipality i at time t, xit
and nit be the observable variables and population size at time t, µi be an un-
observable municipality ﬁxed eﬀect of unknown distribution, and ﬁnally let
vit be a municipality and time speciﬁc disturbance of unknown distribution,
but with a conditional expectation of one, i.e. E [vit|xi,n i,µ i]=1 ,w h e r e
xi and ni denotes the whole vector of observations for municipality i.T h e
last assumption implies that our variables are strictly exogenous, which of
great importance for the consistency of the estimation results. This assump-
tion will be tested in the empirical section. Following Hausman, Hall, and
Griliches (1984) we have the following ﬁxed eﬀect Poisson model (FEP) for
the crime counts
cit|xi,n i,µ i ∼ Po(µiλit)
14where µiλit is the conditional mean of cit and λit > 0 is the underlying








Thus, the conditional mean of cit is
E [cit|xi,n i,µ i]=E [µiλit|.]=E [nitCit|.]=nitµie
xitβ0 = µie
ln(nit)+xitβ0 (2)
which is the expected conditional crime rate times the population size. Fur-
thermore, cit,c ir are assumed to be independent conditional on xi,n i,µ i for
t 6= r.
As for the continuous ﬁxed eﬀect model we must remove the ﬁxed eﬀect in
order to estimate β0. Letting ci =
XT
t=1 cit b et h es u mo fc r i m ec o u n t sa c r o s s
time then ci =( ci1,...,c iT)0, the vector of crime counts, is multinomially
distributed







Thus, conditioning on the sum of crime counts in the municipality we can
remove the ﬁxed eﬀect. Since this distribution does not depend on µi we
can estimate β0 with standard maximum likelihood methods. We have the






cit log[pt (xi,n i,β)].
Some of the assumptions of the FEP, such as the equality between the
mean and the variance of the Poisson distribution, might be a bit restrictive.
Furthermore, other assumptions might also be violated, but the FEP model
h a sn i c er o b u s t n e s sp r o p e r t i e s .
Since the multinomial distribution is a member of the linear exponential
family, the results of Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984) on pseudo
maximum likelihood estimation imply that if
E [cit|ci,x i,n i]=pt (xi,n i,β0)ci (3)
then the multinomial pseudo maximum likelihood estimator (PMLE) is con-
sistent and asymptotically normal, even if the multinomial distribution is
15misspeciﬁed (for proof see Wooldridge 1999). That is, given that the con-
ditional mean, equation (2), is correctly speciﬁed, including the strict exo-
geneity of xit, our estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal and we
can estimate our model without further distributional assumptions. The esti-
m a t e sm i g h tn o tb ee ﬃcient, however.6 Furthermore, the ordinary maximum
likelihood standard errors are not valid for inference. The standard errors
must be made robust against misspeciﬁcation, which is straightforward (see
Wooldridge 1999, equations 3.8 - 3.11). The robust standard errors might be
larger or smaller than the ordinary standard errors.
5 Data Description
The data set used here constitutes a balanced panel covering 261 of 290
municipalities in Sweden and the time period 1998 to 2001.7 The data is
compiled from diﬀerent sources, which together with variable deﬁnitions are
described in the appendix. As mentioned in section two, the nature of the
phenomenon studied aﬀects the quality of the data. Before we go into the
data used here a discussion about data quality is warranted.
5.1 Data Quality
There are diﬀerent types of aggregated statistics concerning crime. We have
already encountered two of them in section two; persons found guilty of
crimes and persons suspected of crime. Others include the number of re-
ported crimes and clear up rates. The only data over crime available at the
municipality level is the number of crimes reported to the police. However,
oﬃcial crime statistics do not measure the actual amount of crimes com-
mitted, but rather the amount reported to the police. How large the dark
ﬁgures, i.e. crimes not reported, are is unknown and varies between diﬀerent
types of crime and over time.
According to Coleman and Moynihan (1996) oﬃcial crime statistics pro-
duction can be viewed as a social process. The deﬁnitions of what a crime is
are themselves results of wider social processes, which reﬂect religious, politi-
cal and other considerations, and form the framework for the crime statistics
6Given that the assumptions for the FEP are satisﬁed Hahn (1997) has shown that
FEP is the eﬃcient semi-parametric estimator.
7Of the 29 municipalities excluded, 23 are are excluded due to missing data. However,
Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö are excluded because of their unique situation, being the
only large cities, which can be expected to give them special crime patterns. Furthermore,
in 1999 Södertälje was split into Södertälje and Nykvarn, both municipalities are excluded
from the analysis. In 2003, i.e. outside our sample, Knivsta was formed.
16production. Besides these wider social processes Coleman et. al. divide the
process into four main stages: discovery, reporting, recording and ’clearing
up’.
First of all, for a crime to be recorded it must be discovered and considered
as a criminal oﬀence. Individuals diﬀer in their notion and knowledge of what
constitutes a crime, and for some crimes there are no victims to discover the
c r i m eo rt h ev i c t i mm i g h tb eu n a w a r et h a tac r i m eh a sb e e nc o m m i t t e d .F o r
certain crimes where there is no clear victim who has an interest of bringing
the crime to the attention of the police, such as drug related crimes, the
police plays an important role in discovering them.
The agent who discovers the crime must report it to the police in order for
it to become a ﬁgure in the statistics. The propensity to report is therefore
central for how large the under-coverage is. The seriousness of the crime
aﬀects the propensity to report, more serious oﬀences are more likely to
be reported. However, the social and psychological context, such as the
nature of any relationship to the oﬀender, expectations of police reaction
or performance, implications of insurance policies held, fears about possible
consequences of reporting, also matters.
The propensity to report also varies over time. For example, there have
been considerable changes in the way schools handle school yard ﬁghts re-
sulting in increasing reports of assault due to a higher propensity to report
to the police (Estrada 2001). Furthermore, other factors such as economic
cycles and socioeconomic factors may aﬀect the propensity to report. Mac-
Donald (2000) examines the probability to report a burglary in Britain and
ﬁn d st h a ts o c i o e c o n o m i cf a c t o r sa n de c o n o m i cc y c l ef a c t o r s ,s u c ha su n e m -
ployment, aﬀect the propensity to report. Thus, aﬀe c t i n gt h es i z eo ft h ed a r k
ﬁgure.
When a crime is discovered and reported to the police it must be recorded
and classiﬁed. Diﬀerences in practices and recording procedures might exist
over time and space, making intertemporal comparisons and comparisons
between countries problematic.
Finally, in order to produce statistics tied to individuals, such as persons
found guilty, the crime must be cleared up. The term cleared up is a bit
misguiding. For example, all crimes where the crime can not be proven
and is written of are considered cleared up. Clear up rates diﬀer between
diﬀerent crime types over time. Crimes where there is an interaction between
the oﬀender and the victim typically have a higher clear up rate than crimes
w i t h o u ti n t e r a c t i o n . C r i m e sw h e r et h eo ﬀender is at the scene at the time
of the police arrival have the highest clear up rates. Police resources and
priorities also aﬀects the clear up rates for diﬀerent crime types.
Although there are some problems with measurement errors this might
17not cause too much estimation problems, as long as we have an estimation
method that can handle these problems. A plausible assumption about the
error structure is that it is multiplicative, such that the reported crime counts
a r eaf r a c t i o no ft h et r u ea m o u n to fc r i m e sc o m m i t t e d .I ft h ef r a c t i o ni sc o n -
stant over time in each municipality, possibly dependent on the explanatory
variables, the measurement error will be a part of the municipality ﬁxed ef-
fect, and will not cause any problems. Furthermore, if the fraction varies
over time and is the same in all municipalities, the inclusion of time dum-
mies will capture the measurement error, and our estimation results will not
suﬀer from any measurement error problems. If the measurement error frac-
tion varies over time and space the measurement error will be a part of the
disturbance term. As long as the measurement error is uncorrelated with our
independent variables this will cause no problems. However, if there is a cor-
relation the strict exogeneity assumption will be violated, and our estimates
will be inconsistent.
5.2 Dependent Variables
Ideally we would like to have the actual number of crimes committed by
youths in each municipality as the dependent variable, but as noticed in
section 2 these are not available. Instead the dependent variable in the
empirical model is the municipality reported crime counts, measured by the
number of crimes registered by the police. These are the only crime statistics
available at the municipality level. Four diﬀerent crime categories will be
used. Since we are interested in the eﬀect of public spending on youths
and crime, but we have no data on their criminal activity, crimes mainly
committed by youths will most likely contain a relationship if at all there is
any.
As we noted in section two, youths are overrepresented in the crime statis-
tics both regarding persons found guilty and persons suspected of all criminal
oﬀences. For some crimes this overrepresentation is larger than for others.
Whether this is due to bias in the recording procedure or not is an open
question. We will here utilize four crimes; assault against unfamiliar man
(ASSAULT), inﬂicting damage by means of graﬃti (GRAFFITI), moped
theft (MOPED) and robbery of individuals (ROBBERY).
As discussed above all these variables are subject to measurement er-
ror to varying extent. The measurement error in moped theft is probably
small since the propensity to report these crimes can be assumed to be high.
This is due to the fact that insurance companies demand the crime to be re-
ported to the police for the insurance to be valid (National Council for Crime
Prevention 2001). Insurance fraud might also cause crimes to be recorded in
18the wrong category, e.g. as moped theft instead as fraud, but this ought to
be a small ﬁgure.
For the other crimes there are reasons to believe that the measurement
errors are larger (National Council for Crime Prevention 2001). For crimes
of inﬂicting damage, including graﬃti, the error can be assumed to be large
because these crimes are generally hard to clear up. This causes victims to
think that a report will result in nothing and is therefore futile. However,
it can be assumed that the larger the damage the higher the propensity
to report. Furthermore, if the damage exceeds any insurance excess the
propensity to report will be higher. Thus, for more serious oﬀences the
error can be assumed to be smaller. The same is true for assault, where the
propensity to report can be assumed to be higher for more serious oﬀences.
Finally, for robbery of individuals the error can be suspected to be large.
The victim of these robberies are usually youths and individuals in asocial
environments, both with low propensity to report. The reasons for the low
propensity include: a report is seen as futile, a belief that the oﬀenders
will not get punished, and victims are afraid of reprisals if a report is made.
Thus, all the crimes used here will suﬀer from measurement errors due to dark
ﬁgures. However, if the measurement error is a fraction of the committed
crimes and constant over time in each municipality it would be a part of the
municipality ﬁxed eﬀect.
Another source of concern is that for some crimes, no municipality have
been recorded. The number of crimes missing this information varies con-
siderable between diﬀerent counties and years. The problem is largest in
1996, when the recording of crimes at the municipality level started, and has
decreased over time (National Council for Crime Prevention 2002).
Furthermore, recording practices might have changed over time, and may
in practice diﬀer between police districts. For example, in 1999 the registra-
tion of robberies was changed, and robberies of individuals was reported as
a category of its own. Until then registration of these robberies was made
under ’Other robberies’, separated from more gross robberies, such as bank
robbery, but together with a small amount of other type of robberies. The
separation of the categories have not been successful in practice and in 2001
most robberies recorded under other robberies were in fact robberies of indi-
viduals (National Council for Crime Prevention 2001).
Table 2 displays some descriptive statistics for our crime variables. The
smallest possible crime count, zero, is observed for all four crimes. The
percentage of the observations that are zero is for ROBBERY 17 percent,
MOPED six percent, ASSAULT one percent, and GRAFFITI nine percent
of the total number of observations, which is 1,044. Thus, the zero ’problem’
is largest for ROBBERY and almost not an issue for ASSAULT, but without
19Table 2: Dependent variables, descriptive statistics
ROBBERY MOPED ASSAULT GRAFFITI
Max 204 408 454 1349
Min 0 0 0 0
1st quartile 1 2 9 2
Median 3 7 21.5 8
3rd quartile 8 18 52 29
Zeros 177 65 12 91
Mean crime rate 24.0 48.1 143.6 114.1
Max crime rate 254.7 339.3 488.5 1563.5
tampering with the data we cannot estimate a continuous model. Further-
more, we can see in the table from the median and the quartiles that many
of the crime rates would have been calculated from low counts, making poor
approximations of the underlying crime rate. The low crime counts is partly
due to the small population sizes of the Swedish municipalities, and that we
are studying crimes at a low level of aggregation.
W ec a na l s on o t i c et h a tr o b b e r i e sa r et h el e a s tc o m m o nc r i m e ,w i t ht h e
lowest maximum and quartiles, followed by moped theft. Graﬃti follows with
a low median and quartiles, but with a large maximum count. The highest
median and quartiles do assault have, but with a lower maximum count than
graﬃti. In the table, crime rates, in terms of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants,
are also displayed. We can notice that after this normalization there are
large diﬀerences between municipalities, i.e. there is a large span between
the minimum crime rate, zero, and the maximum crime rate for all crimes.
Furthermore, the mean crime rate orders the crimes in the same order as the
median, and quartiles. Thus, the most common crime is assault, followed by
graﬃti, moped theft and, ﬁnally, robbery.
5.3 Independent Variables
In section three several diﬀerent determinants of crime were pointed out, but
some of these are hard to quantify and data availability limits the scope of
including others. However, there are some variables readily available.
First of all, from equation (2) we can see that the model implies the
inclusion of the logarithm of the population with a coeﬃcient restricted to
one in our independent variables. However, it is also plausible that the per
capita crime rates are dependent on the population size. For example, in
smaller municipalities where ’everybody knows everybody’ the possibility
20for anonymity might be smaller than in larger municipalities, which could
for example increase the probability of being identiﬁed when committing a
crime. The increased probability of identiﬁcation could deter criminal be-
havior, and thus aﬀect the crime rates. The natural logarithm of population
size (POPULATION) is therefore one of the explanatory variables and en-
ters unrestricted. In Table 3 some descriptive statistics are displayed for our
independent variables. The mean population is around 26,500 whereas the
median is about 15,500. Thus, a considerable portion of the municipalities
have relatively small populations, and the distribution is quite skewed. Fur-
thermore, there is a large span between the smallest municipality and the
largest municipality in the sample.
Turning to the variables of greatest interest here, the expenditure vari-
ables, there are two diﬀerent types of expenditures included. The ﬁrst one is
the leisure related municipality spending (LEISURE). Included in this vari-
able are the municipalities’ spending on grants to clubs and associations,
sports and recreational venues, and youth recreation centers. Furthermore,
the variables is measured in 100 Swedish Kronor (SKr) per capita, and is in
1998 year’s prices. The mean and the median are a bit below 1,000 SKr per
capita, and we have a large span from 155 to 3,561 SKr per capita suggesting
that the policies diﬀer quite substantially between the municipalities.
The second type of expenditure is the municipality expenditure on upper
secondary schools (EDUCATION), measured as 10,000 SKr per student in
1998 year’s prices. Included in this measure is all the municipalities’ spending
on upper secondary schools, e.g. spending on teachers, venues, and teaching
aids.
In section three we discussed the possible impact of these variables on
crime rates and the eﬀect could go in either direction. Furthermore, the two
expenditure variables enter the model both in levels and in squares to allow
for decreasing and increasing eﬀects.
The demographic and the socioeconomic status and composition of the
municipalities are controlled for with seven diﬀerent variables, which can
be expected to inﬂuence the crime rates. Starting with the demographic
variables, the percentage of men aged 15 to 19 (MEN1519) and the percentage
of men aged 20 to 24 (MEN2024) in each municipality are included in the
model. Since we are focusing on crimes that can be thought of as youth
crimes the larger the proportion of young individuals the higher the crime
rates for these crimes. Furthermore, men tend to be more crime prone than
women. Therefore are these demographic variables included in the model.
In section three theory pointed to, among other things, socioeconomic
status, resident mobility, and ethnic heterogeneity as factors behind crime
rates. The socioeconomic variables in c l u d e dh e r ea r et h ea v e r a g ei n c o m e
21Table 3: Independent variables, hypothesized signs and descriptive statistics
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max Median
POPULATION 26,511 27,139 2,668 190,342 15,513
MEN1519 3.14 0.27 1.91 4.23 3.13
MEN2024 2.70 0.49 1.74 6.03 2.59
INCOME 11.10 1.60 8.12 24.11 10.83
UNEMPLOYMENT 4.50 1.74 0.95 11.50 4.38
WELFARE 4.32 1.55 0.60 11.01 4.16
MOVING 4.50 1.36 1.82 11.63 4.30
IMMIGRANTS 3.81 2.73 0.72 27.62 3.07
LEISURE 9.75 3.50 1.55 35.61 9.40
EDUCATION 7.42 1.03 4.85 11.48 7.31
(INCOME) measured as the per capita taxable income in 10,000 SKr, the
percentage of the population above 17 years of age receiving social welfare
payments (WELFARE), the percentage of the population aged 18 to 64 that
is registered as unemployed (UNEMPLOYMENT), the percentage of indi-
viduals with foreign citizenship (IMMIGRANTS), and the percentage of the
population that moves into a municipality a given year (MOVING). The ﬁrst
three variables can be thought of as measuring the socioeconomic status of
the community, and the last two ethnic heterogeneity and resident mobility,
respectively.
According to social disorganization theory crime rates should be decreas-
ing in income, and increasing for the other variables. However, higher income
implies higher attractiveness of targets for crimes and higher concentration
of targets, e.g. in our case more mopeds to steal or richer individuals to
rob, which according to criminal opportunity theory should increase crime.
Higher unemployment rates might also lead to increased supervision of youths
and guardianship over property, which could decrease crime rates. All in all
the signs of these variables could always be discussed, but these variables
are not the focus of this paper. These variables are included to control for
observed heterogeneity, which can be expected to aﬀect crime rates.
The Swedish municipalities diﬀer in many ways which aﬀect the number
of crimes observed. Some ways are unobservable. These will be accounted
for by the ﬁxed eﬀect, if they are constant over time. Other ways are more or
less observable and the variables discussed above hopefully takes these into
account. However, it is plausible and quite probable that the eﬀects, both
in magnitude and direction, of the variables diﬀer between diﬀerent types
of municipalities. For example, the eﬀect of leisure expenditure might be
22Table 4: Municipality groups
Dummy N
D1 Large city municipalities 24
D2 Sparsely populated municipalities 25
D3 Small municipalities 39
D4 Rural municipalities 28
D5 Industrial municipalities 43
D6 Large municipalities 29
D7 Medium-sized city municipalities 39
D8 Suburban municipalities 34
quite diﬀerent between a sparsely-populated rural municipality and an urban
municipality. In order to allow for diﬀerent eﬀects, the municipalities are
divided into eight groups according to Table 4.8 Interaction terms between
our expenditure variables and group dummies (D2, D3, ..., D8) are included
in the model. D1 is left out in the estimations. Furthermore, time dummies
are also included to capture developments of the crime rates over time.
In this set of independent variables, an important group of variables are
missing; deterrence variables, such as clearance rates, sentence lengths, and
police expenditure, which are of great importance in economic theories of
crime. Unfortunately there is no deterrence variables available at the munic-
ipality level. However, if these variables are ﬁx e df o rt h et i m ep e r i o ds t u d i e d
they will become part of the ﬁxed eﬀect. Otherwise the eﬀect of these vari-
ables will be part of the disturbance term and cause problems if they are
correlated with our explanatory variables. Furthermore, all municipalities
face the same justice system, which implies that changes in the justice sys-
tem will at least aﬀect the municipalities in a similar fashion. Thus, any
changes to the justice system will be picked up by the time dummies.
Furthermore, some of the variables used here might not be strictly ex-
ogenous. This could be the case for the variables of greatest interest, the
expenditure variables. If the politicians conceive them as crime ﬁghting tools
shocks to the crime rates will cause changes in the expenditure. Fortunately,
we can test the assumption of strict exogeneity.
8The groups follow the Swedish Association of Local Authorities’ classiﬁcation of mu-
nicipalities based on certain criteria, such as population size, population density, labor
market aspects. See appendix for further details.
236 Estimation Results and Speciﬁcation Test-
ing
In Table 5, estimation results from the multinomial pseudo maximum like-
lihood estimator (PMLE) are displayed for our diﬀerent crimes. Ordinary
maximum likelihood estimates of the standard errors are reported in paren-
thesis and the robust counterparts are reported in brackets. All discussions
about signiﬁcance refer to the robust standard errors, and is noted in the
text, e.g. (0.05)f o rs i g n i ﬁcance at the ﬁve percent level.
The interpretation of the coeﬃcients is fairly straightforward, keeping in
mind that the coeﬃcients originates from the underlying crime rate process.
For the logarithm of the population, the coeﬃcient minus one is the constant
elasticity between crime rates and the population; for the other variables the
elasticity varies.9 However, we can easily calculate the elasticities at speciﬁc
values, e.g. at the means of the variables. Elasticities for signiﬁcant variables
are shown in Table 6 for MOPED and in Table 7 for GRAFFITI; for the other
two crimes elasticities will be presented in the text.
Starting with the ﬁrst row in Table 5, we notice that the logarithm of the
population size is only signiﬁcantly diﬀe r e n tf r o mo n ei nt h ec a s eo fM O P E D
theft, with a t-value of 2.69, indicating an elasticity between moped theft
c r i m er a t ea n dp o p u l a t i o ns i z eo f5.7. For the other crime variables there is
no eﬀect of population size on the crime rates.
Table 5: Estimation results: Multinomial PMLE
Variable ROBBERY MOPED ASSAULT GRAFFITI
ln(POPULATION) -0.9560 6.6592 0.6048 1.8600
(1.6192) (1.0752) (0.6728) (0.7488)
[1.8364] [2.1028] [0.9416] [3.9140]
MEN1519 0.3705 0.0407 0.3429 0.1133
(0.2266) (0.1571) (0.0930) (0.1027)
[0.2847] [0.2758] [0.1167] [0.5324]
Continued on next page...
MLE standard errors in parenthesis, robust standard errors in brackets.
All models include time dummies.
9If we include the logarithm of the population and one other variable, including its
square, as regressors we have the following relation in the model, excluding subscripts λ =
nC = neln(n)(βn−1)+xβ1+x2β2 = eln(n)+ln(n)(βn−1)+xβ1+x2β2 = eln(n)βn+xβ1+x2β2 where







C =( βn−1) and for the other variable ∂C
∂x
x
C =( β1+2xβ2)C x
C =( β1+2xβ2)x
and if the square is not included ∂C
∂x
x
C = β1C x
C = β1x.
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Variable ROBBERY MOPED ASSAULT GRAFFITI
MEN2024 -0.4667 0.4054 -0.1425 0.3701
(0.1850) (0.1301) (0.0766) (0.0822)
[0.2254] [0.2348] [0.1123] [0.4424]
INCOME -0.8766 -2.0555 -0.2246 -2.6477
(0.6678) (0.4953) (0.3872) (0.2719)
[1.3543] [0.8673] [0.4280] [2.0228]
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.0476 -0.0249 -0.0139 -0.1015
(0.0387) (0.0281) (0.0154) (0.0184)
[0.0458] [0.0577] [0.0196] [0.0857]
WELFARE -0.0248 0.0549 0.0382 0.1674
(0.0355) (0.0283) (0.0157) (0.0177)
[0.0571] [0.0482] [0.0189] [0.1132]
MOVING 0.0249 0.0127 -0.0291 0.0121
(0.0446) (0.0339) (0.0207) (0.0198)
[0.0612] [0.0514] [0.0235] [0.1100]
IMMIGRANTS 0.1420 -0.1889 0.0957 -0.1036
(0.0732) (0.0559) (0.0303) (0.0382)
[0.1022] [0.0830] [0.0358] [0.1535]
LEISURE -0.0818 0.4679 -0.0406 -1.0254
(0.1449) (0.1146) (0.0531) (0.0760)
[0.1691] [0.1809] [0.0552] [0.4448]
LEISURExD2 0.3481 -1.1426 0.0446 1.6718
(0.6391) (0.6249) (0.1428) (0.2887)
[0.4130] [0.5252] [0.1093] [0.7559]
LEISURExD3 -0.1094 -0.4278 0.0090 1.3163
(0.2207) (0.1695) (0.1001) (0.1474)
[0.1912] [0.2089] [0.0850] [0.5562]
LEISURExD4 0.1134 -0.5411 -0.0640 1.2347
(0.4161) (0.3053) (0.1531) (0.2040)
[0.3286] [0.4076] [0.2200] [0.5718]
LEISURExD5 0.0705 -0.5939 0.0648 1.1749
(0.2532) (0.1672) (0.0878) (0.1273)
[0.2406] [0.2246] [0.1021] [0.5041]
LEISURExD6 0.1860 -0.5017 0.0555 1.7478
(0.2271) (0.1589) (0.0865) (0.1889)
[0.2258] [0.2102] [0.0695] [0.5542]
Continued on next page...
MLE standard errors in parenthesis, robust standard errors in brackets.
All models include time dummies.
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LEISURExD7 0.1424 -0.3827 0.0795 0.5059
(0.2698) (0.1928) (0.0928) (0.1191)
[0.2820] [0.2340] [0.1106] [0.5189]
LEISURExD8 -0.1605 -0.5344 -0.1288 1.0722
(0.2099) (0.1596) (0.1037) (0.1037)
[0.2162] [0.1984] [0.1345] [0.5216]
LEISURE2 0.0033 -0.0150 0.0019 0.0461
(0.0068) (0.0053) (0.0024) (0.0036)
[0.0076] [0.0076] [0.0024] [0.0212]
LEISURE2xD2 -0.0271 0.0474 -0.0032 -0.0655
(0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0057) (0.0115)
[0.0178] [0.0238] [0.0041] [0.0323]
LEISURE2xD3 0.0046 0.0137 0.0010 -0.0560
(0.0096) (0.0074) (0.0042) (0.0059)
[0.0082] [0.0088] [0.0034] [0.0243]
LEISURE2xD4 -0.0041 0.0197 0.0068 -0.0711
(0.0263) (0.0183) (0.0099) (0.0132)
[0.0209] [0.0234] [0.0155] [0.0349]
LEISURE2xD5 -0.0027 0.0211 -0.0018 -0.0520
(0.0093) (0.0067) (0.0034) (0.0054)
[0.0084] [0.0083] [0.0031] [0.0246]
LEISURE2xD6 -0.0120 0.0176 -0.0035 -0.0924
(0.0120) (0.0082) (0.0045) (0.0097)
[0.0124] [0.0100] [0.0037] [0.0303]
LEISURE2xD7 -0.0087 0.0124 -0.0048 -0.0193
(0.0123) (0.0087) (0.0041) (0.0052)
[0.0132] [0.0096] [0.0048] [0.0236]
LEISURE2xD8 0.0065 0.0166 0.0080 -0.0456
(0.0105) (0.0083) (0.00558) (0.0053)
[0.0109] [0.0087] [0.0080] [0.0268]
EDUCATION -0.3185 -0.4042 0.0001 1.8215
(0.3941) (0.3528) (0.1622) (0.1781)
[0.6373] [0.5135] [0.1464] [0.9779]
EDUCATIONxD2 -6.2538 1.0762 -0.4927 -4.7893
(3.6953) (1.9471) (0.6502) (0.9954)
[2.9801] [1.8136] [0.7143] [1.7605]
Continued on next page...
MLE standard errors in parenthesis, robust standard errors in brackets.
All models include time dummies.
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EDUCATIONxD3 -0.9990 0.1517 -0.1842 0.0465
(1.1695) (0.7607) (0.3571) (0.4694)
[1.0117] [0.8571] [0.3855] [1.7018]
EDUCATIONxD4 1.2619 1.3885 0.6680 -2.7490
(1.8115) (1.0241) (0.6324) (0.9090)
[1.2915] [0.9263] [0.8046] [3.2637]
EDUCATIONxD5 -0.9083 -0.3855 -0.3480 2.2666
(1.0267) (0.6848) (0.3719) (0.5173)
[0.9834] [0.8869] [0.4362] [1.5537]
EDUCATIONxD6 -1.4279 -0.6230 0.0076 0.4198
(0.9557) (0.6571) (0.3349) (0.4887)
[0.9713] [0.8462] [0.3864] [1.9969]
EDUCATIONxD7 0.3143 -0.9015 -0.2702 -2.7954
(0.6722) (0.5489) (0.2672) (0.3199)
[0.7977] [0.7180] [0.3308] [1.4476]
EDUCATIONxD8 -0.0005 0.7492 -0.0691 -1.9996
(0.5135) (0.4767) (0.2503) (0.2284)
[0.7529] [0.7422] [0.3226] [1.4342]
EDUCATION2 0.0207 0.0236 -0.0001 -0.1195
(0.0272) (0.0243) (0.0111) (0.0127)
[0.0428] [0.0357] [0.0099] [0.0710]
EDUCATION2xD2 0.3245 -0.0649 0.0213 0.2817
(0.2054) (0.1107) (0.0375) (0.0567)
[0.1688] [0.0996] [0.0423] [0.1095]
EDUCATION2xD3 0.0598 -0.0117 0.0110 -0.0100
(0.0785) (0.0509) (0.0235) (0.0322)
[0.0646] [0.0581] [0.0247] [0.1151]
EDUCATION2xD4 -0.0995 -0.0938 -0.0513 0.2003
(0.1287) (0.0723) (0.0449) (0.0635)
[0.0915] [0.0648] [0.0557] [0.2228]
EDUCATION2xD5 0.0604 0.0248 0.0272 -0.1331
(0.0693) (0.0471) (0.0253) (0.0343)
[0.0669] [0.0612] [0.0301] [0.1044]
EDUCATION2xD6 0.0942 0.0306 -0.0033 -0.0326
(0.0634) (0.0441) (0.0224) (0.0326)
[0.0652] [0.0563] [0.0257] [0.1349]
Continued on next page...
MLE standard errors in parenthesis, robust standard errors in brackets.
All models include time dummies.
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EDUCATION2xD7 -0.0283 0.0762 0.0195 0.1867
(0.0495) (0.0397) (0.0195) (0.0236)
[0.0562] [0.0520] [0.0243] [0.1070]
EDUCATION2xD8 0.0057 -0.0535 0.0033 0.1311
(0.0355) (0.0336) (0.0174) (0.0161)
[0.0534] [0.0507] [0.0230] [0.0994]
Conditional mean test 36.98 35.49 41.67 57.31
Robust Hausman test 32.86 37.67 41.20 60.49
MLE standard errors in parenthesis, robust standard errors in brackets.
All models include time dummies.
Turning to the other variables, starting with the estimation results for
ROBBERY, there are only three variables that turn out signiﬁcant, at con-
ventional levels, i.e. (0.10), (0.05)a n d( 0.01). The percentage of men aged
20 to 24, (0.05), has a negative eﬀect on the robbery rate. The elasticity
at the mean is around −1.24.T h e o t h e r t w o s i g n i ﬁcant variables are the
expenditure on education, both in level and its square, in sparsely populated
municipalities, EDUCATIONxD2 (0.05)a n dE D U C A T I O N 2xD2 (0.10). The
signs and the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients, −6.238 and 0.3245, respectively,
indicates a negative relationship between the robbery rate and education
spending in sparsely populated municipalities, which turn positive at a high
level of spending. The relationship is negative up to a spending of approxi-
mately 95,000 SKr per student, a level of spending that is above the mean
spending, 87,993, in this group of municipalities. The elasticity evaluated at
the mean spending is approximately −10.0. The magnitude of the elasticity
will, however, depend on how far away we are from the critical point, e.g.
where the ﬁrst derivative is equal to zero; the further away, the larger, in
absolute terms, the elasticity.
The estimation results for ASSAULT, in the third column, also show
only three signiﬁcant variables; the percentage of men between the aged 15
to 19, (0.01), the percentage of immigrants, (0.01), and the percentage of
the population receiving social welfare payments, (0.05) .T h ep e r c e n t a g eo f
men aged 15 to 19 has a positive impact on the assault rate in a municipality
with an elasticity evaluated at the mean percentage, 3.1,o f1.1.T h eo t h e r
two variables have smaller positive eﬀects. The percentage of immigrants has
a positive eﬀect with an elasticity of 0.4 at the mean percentage, 3.8.T h e
28Table 6: Moped theft elasticities
Variable Mean Elasticity Sign to the left Critical point Sign to the right
MEN2024 2.7 1.1 x x x
INCOME 110,737 -2.3 x x x
IMMIGRANTS 3.8 -0.7 x x x
LEISURE for D1 1,118 1.5 + 1,560 -
LEISURE for D2 1,141 0.7 - 1,041 +
LEISURE for D3 922 -2.2 + 133 -
LEISURE for D4 767 1.8 + 1,560 -
LEISURE for D5 1,051 0.0 - 1,032 +
LEISURE for D6 988 0.2 - 650 +
LEISURE for D7 1,014 1.7 + 1,560 -
LEISURE for D8 831 20.3 - 22 +
percentage of social welfare recipients has an even smaller positive eﬀect,
with an elasticity of 0.2 at the mean, 4.3.
For the last two crimes there are more signiﬁcant variables. For MOPED
theft, the second column in Table 5, the percentage of men aged 20 to 24,
(0.10), the per capita taxable income, (0.05), the percentage of immigrants,
(0.05), and there are signiﬁcant leisure spending in most municipality groups.
We have the following signiﬁcant variables; LEISURE (0.01), and the inter-
action between LEISURE and D2 (0.05), D3 (0.05), D5 (0.01), D6 (0.05)
and D8 (0.05); LEISURE2 (0.05), and the interaction between LEISURE2
and D2 (0.05), D5 (0.05), D6 (0.10)a n dD 8( 0.10). In Table 6 the elasticities
e v a l u a t e da tt h em e a n ,w h i c ha r ed i s p l a y e di nt h et a b l ei nS K rp e rc a p i t a ,
are presented for our signiﬁcant eﬀects. Table 6 also presents the critical
point in SKr per capita, for the elasticities, and the corresponding signs on
each side. For municipality groups that do not have an own signiﬁcant eﬀect,
t h ee n t r i e si nt h et a b l ea r ec a l c u l a t e da tt h ec o m m o nc o e ﬃcients, i.e. the
coeﬃcients without the dummy interaction.
The percentage of men aged 20 to 24 has a small positive impact with a
near unit elasticity at the mean, a result that is in contrast to the estimation
results for ROBBERY. Another result that is in contrast with previous dis-
cussed results is the negative impact of the percentage of immigrants with
an elasticity of −0.7, which is in contrast with the ASSAULT estimation
results. For the taxable income we have an elasticity at the mean of −2.3.
The estimation results for LEISURE give a mixed picture of public spending
on leisure and the impact on the moped theft crime rate. Half of the mu-
nicipality groups have a relationship that starts out positive and eventually
29turn negative. Large city (D1), rural (D4), and medium-sized city (D7) mu-
nicipalities have the same relationship since D4 and D7 are not signiﬁcant.
The critical point is at 1,560 SKr, a level that is above the means of these
groups. Hence, we have positive elasticities at the means. Furthermore, this
critical point is the highest in the estimation. The last group with a positive
to negative relationship, small municipalities (D3), has a much lower critical
point at just above 100 SKr, resulting in a negative elasticity at the mean.
The remaining municipality groups all have a negative to positive rela-
tionship with varying critical points; 1,041 SKr for sparsely populated munic-
ipalities (D2), 1,032 SKr for industrial municipalities (D5), 650 SKr for large
municipalities (D6), and ﬁnally 22 SKr for suburban municipalities (D8). The
estimated elasticities at the mean are all non-negative for all these groups
since they spend above the critical point in average. Noteworthy is that the
suburban municipalities have a very low critical point, which basically give
us a positive relationship for reasonable levels of spending.
The mixed picture is also present in the estimation results for GRAF-
FITI, albeit some of the relationships have the reversed signs as we shall
see. In the fourth column in Table 5, GRAFFITI, we have no signiﬁcant so-
cioeconomic variables, but several LEISURE and EDUCATION variables are
signiﬁcant. All LEISURE variables are signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level, ex-
cept LEISURExD6 (0.01), LEISURE2xD6 (0.01), LEISURE2xD8 (0.10), and
LEISURExD7 which is together with LEISURE2xD7 insigniﬁcant. Turning
to EDUCATION we have the following signiﬁcant variables, EDUCATION
(0.10), EDUCATIONxD2 (0.05), EDUCATIONxD7 (0.10), EDUCATION2
(0.10), EDUCATION2xD2 (0.01)a n dE D U C A T I O N 2xD7 (0.10). Table 7
displays the mean, in SKr per capita, the elasticity evaluated at the mean,
the critical point and the sign of the eﬀect for LEISURE and EDUCATION
for all municipality groups.
Two of the municipality groups, large city (D1) and medium-sized (D7)
city municipalities have a negative to positive relationship between public
leisure spending and graﬃti crime rate, and the mean spending are close to
the critical point, 1,121 SKr, in both groups. Furthermore, the relationship
is reversed compared to the estimation results for moped theft. Suburban
municipalities (D8) have a strictly positive relationship for positive values
of expenditure. An estimation result that almost corresponds to the moped
theft results, where we had a very low critical point close to zero.
All other municipality groups have a positive to negative relationship with
varying critical points in the span 419 to 1,682 SKr. Small (D3) and rural
(D4) municipalities have the same order of the signs as in the estimation
results for moped theft, but for the rest, the relationship is reversed.
T u r n i n gt ot h ee ﬀect of education spending on graﬃti crime rate, we ﬁnd
30Table 7: Graﬃti elasticities
Variable Mean Elasticity Sign to the left Critical point Sign to the right
LEISURE D1 1,118 0.0 - 1,121 +
LEISURE D2 1,141 2.4 + 1,682 -
LEISURE D3 922 1.0 + 1,469 -
LEISURE D4 767 -1.3 + 419 -
LEISURE D5 1,051 0.3 + 1,267 -
LEISURE D6 988 -1.9 + 780 -
LEISURE D7 1,014 -0.9 - 1,112 +
LEISURE D8 831 0.5 x x x
EDUCATION D1 69,915 1.1 + 76,213 -
EDUCATION D2 87,993 -1.0 - 91,486 +
EDUCATION D3 76,119 0.0 + 76,213 -
EDUCATION D4 72,775 0.6 + 76,213 -
EDUCATION D5 75,700 0.1 + 76,213 -
EDUCATION D6 74,122 0.4 + 76,213 -
EDUCATION D7 69,553 -0.3 - 72,463 +
EDUCATION D8 69,217 1.2 + 76,213 -
that all but two municipality groups have the same positive to negative re-
lationship, with a critical point at 76,213 SKr, due to the fact that there is
not many signiﬁcant interaction terms. Furthermore, we can see in the table
that most municipality groups spend just below the critical point on average,
leading to small positive elasticities at the mean. Sparsely populated munici-
palities (D2) have a negative to positive relationship, which corresponds with
the estimation results for ROBBERY discussed above. The critical point is
relatively high, 91,486 SKr, resulting in a negative elasticity at the mean.
Medium-sized city municipalities (D7) is the second municipality group with
a negative to positive relationship, and have much lower critical point, 72,463
SKr.
6.1 Speciﬁcation tests
Vital for the consistency of the multinomial PMLE are the correct speciﬁ-
cation of the conditional mean and the strict exogeneity of the regressors.
For speciﬁcation testing two diﬀerent tests are employed. The ﬁrst test is
a regression based conditional moment test of equation (2), including the
strict exogeneity assumption, which utilize some extra orthogonality con-
ditions implied by the FEP model (Wooldridge 1999). The second test is
31a robust Hausman test, which also is regression based and robust to any
distributional misspeciﬁcations, and compares the multinomial PMLE and
non-linear least squares estimator with the same conditional mean, equa-
tion (3)(Wooldridge 1991). In this context, a Hausman test will indicate
whether the conditional mean is misspeciﬁed or not, and does not test fur-
ther distributional assumptions. Under the alternative of misspeciﬁcation
both estimators will generally be inconsistent and tend to diﬀerent limits.
Turning to the speciﬁcation tests, the last two rows in Table 5, which
all have a critical value of 59.30 at the ﬁve percent level (χ2with 43 degrees
of freedom), we cannot reject the model speciﬁcation for either test for the
ﬁrst three crimes, ROBBERY, MOPED and ASSAULT as we are far from
t h ec r i t i c a lv a l u e .F o rt h el a s tc r i m e ,G R A F F I T I ,t h es p e c i ﬁcation tests give
mixed results. The conditional mean test is just below the critical value,
and has a p-value of 0.07. Thus, at ﬁve percent level we cannot reject the
conditional mean speciﬁcation. However, the Hausman test is just above the
critical value and has a p-value of 0.04, thus rejecting the speciﬁcation at the
ﬁve percent level.
7 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to investigate if public spending on youths
aﬀects crime rates. A non-linear ﬁxed eﬀect model was estimated using
multinomial pseudo maximum likelihood for four diﬀerent crimes using a
panel of 261 Swedish municipalities over four years. As measures of expendi-
tures on youths municipality spending on upper secondary school per pupil
and leisure related spending per capita were used. Furthermore, the socioe-
conomic composition of the municipalities was controlled for with several
diﬀerent variables.
The main result of the estimation was that there is a relationship between
the two spending types and two of the crimes. For robbery of individuals and
assault where the oﬀender is unknown to the victim the estimation results do
not provide evidence of any relationship, whereas the estimation results for
m o p e dt h e f ta n di n ﬂicting damage with the means of graﬃti, yields a fairly
strong indication that there exist relationships, especially for the leisure re-
lated expenditures. However, the estimated relationships do not provide any
clear cut answers. Instead the estimation results indicate complex relation-
ships between the expenditure types and crime rates.
First of all, the estimation results imply that there is a trade oﬀ between
combating diﬀerent crimes: Spending that reduces the rate of one crime can
increase the rate of another. However, it is quite natural to expect that dif-
32ferent types of crime are aﬀected in diﬀerent ways. Furthermore, there are
’nonlinearities’ in the relationships indicating increasing/decreasing eﬀects
of the expenditure types on crime rates. This implies that there are some
optimal levels of spending. Another important aspect of the estimated rela-
t i o n s h i p si st h a tt h e r ea r ed i ﬀerences between diﬀerent municipality types,
e.g. leisure related expenditures have the opposite eﬀect in large city munic-
ipalities compared to sparsely populated municipalities.
Although the estimation results do not provide any clear answers there
are at least two wider implications of the results. First is the importance to
study speciﬁc crimes, instead of studying broader crime categories. Youths
are relatively more overrepresented in terms of individuals suspected and
found guilty for the two crimes where there is a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
of the spending types. This could either be due to the fact that there is no
eﬀect for the other two crimes, that there is too little variation in the data to
identify any eﬀect, or that the models are inappropriate for the two crimes
where there are no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. However, it also indicates
t h ei m p o r t a n c et os t u d ys p e c i ﬁc crimes since we even at this speciﬁcl e v e l
of crimes get quite diﬀerent statistical outcomes. Furthermore, the trade oﬀ
that is present between combating diﬀerent crimes also stress the importance
to study speciﬁc crimes, to reveal relationships and thereby making it possible
to gain greater understanding of the underlying processes.
Studying speciﬁc crimes in small units of analysis will probably entail
problems for the estimation methods usually used when studying crime rates.
For some types crimes zeros will to be a common observation, which cannot
be handled in log-linearo rl o g - l o gc o n t i n u o u sﬁxed eﬀect models without
tampering with the data. This motivates the empirical model used in this
paper.
The second implication of the estimation results is that it might not be
a good idea to assume homogenous eﬀects across municipalities. Allowing
for diﬀerent eﬀects, we found that both the magnitude and the direction
of estimated relationships diﬀer between diﬀerent types of municipalities,
which is a natural outcome if there is countervailing eﬀects at play. Even
though this might not be the case for some relationships, it should at least
be considered in all investigations. It also raises the question about the
level of aggregation regarding the unit of analysis. The diﬀerences between
diﬀerent types of municipalities would have been lost if the analysis would
have been made at county level, but at the same time using municipality
data we cannot disentangle the eﬀects within a municipality, and further
disaggregation might provide more answers.
This paper has found evidence that there are relationships between mu-
nicipality spending on youths, in the form of overall leisure related spending
33and spending on upper secondary school, and some crime rates. The mea-
sures of spending used here are rather crude, resulting in a crude picture of
the relationships. From this picture it is hard, and it would be speculative
too, to draw any other conclusion than that spending seems to matter and
further research needs to be done in order to give policy suggestions on how
to spend resources to prevent youth crime. Future research might disen-
tangle diﬀerent eﬀects by studying more speciﬁc types of spending, i.e. the
parts that makes up the total spending in this paper, from many diﬀerent
approaches. This could provide deeper understanding of how diﬀerent types
of spending aﬀect youths’ criminal behavior.
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A Appendix
A.1 Variable Deﬁnitions and Data Sources
A.1.1 Dependent Variables
All crime data is from the National Council for Crime Prevention,a n di st h e
number of, by the police, registered crimes in each municipality. We have
the following crimes:
• ROBBERY - includes robberies registered as ’robberies of individuals’
and ’other robberies’.
• MOPED -i n c l u d e sc r i m e sr e g i s t e r e da sm o p e dt h e f t s .
• ASSAULT - includes assaults registered as assaults where the victim
is a man and the oﬀender was unknown to the victim.
• GRAFFITI -i n c l u d e sc r i m e so fi n ﬂicting damage with the means of
graﬃti.
36A.1.2 Independent Variables
The independent variables comes from diﬀerent sources. The following vari-
ables are from Statistics Sweden, www.scb.se
• POPULATION - The total population during each year.
• MEN1519 - The number of individuals aged 15 to 19 divided by the
total population, times 100.
• MEN2024 - The number of individuals aged 20 to 24 divided by the
total population, times 100.
• MOVING - The number of individuals moving into a municipality a
given year divided by the total population, times 100.
• IMMIGRANTS - The number of individuals with foreign citizenship
divided by the total population, times 100.
• WELFARE - The number of social welfare recipients over 17 years of
age divided by the population aged over 17, times 100.
• INCOME - Per capita taxable income.
The following variables are from the Swedish Association of Local Author-
ities’ data base: www.komstat.svekom.se
• LEISURE - Leisure related municipality spending per capita in 1998
year’s prices. The variable includes grants to clubs, associations etc.,
sports and recreational venues, and youth recreation centers.
• EDUCATION - Municipality spending at secondary upper school per
pupil in 1998 year’s prices.
The following variable is from the National Labour Market Board
• UNEMPLOYMENT - The yearly unemployment rate, measured as
the percentage of individuals in the work force aged 18 to 64 registered
as unemployed.
37A.1.3 Municipality Dummies
The municipality dummies follow from the Swedish Association of Local Au-
thorities classiﬁcation of municipalities, which divides the municipalities into
nine diﬀerent groups. The classiﬁcation is based on the following variables:
population size, location, degree of urbanization, population density, and
trade and industry structure. We have the following groups, where the ﬁrst
group is excluded from our analysis.
• Big city municipalities: Municipalities with a population exceeding
200,000
• D1 - Large city municipalities: Municipalities with an urbanization
degree above 70 percent, a population that exceeds 50,000, and with
less that 40 percent of the work force employed in industry.
• D2 - Sparsely populated municipalities: Municipality with less
than ﬁve inhabitants per km2, and with a population not exceeding
20,000.
• D3 - Small municipalities: Municipalities with a population less
than 15,000, and do not fall into any other group.
• D4 - Rural municipalities: Municipalities with an urbanization de-
gree below 70 percent, at least 8.7 percent of the work force employed
in agriculture and forestry, and do not belong to the sparsely populated
municipality group.
• D5 - Industrial municipalities: Municipalities with more than 40
percent of the workforce employed in industry, and do not belong to
the sparsely populated municipality group.
• D6 - Large municipalities: Municipalities with a population be-
tween 15,000 and 50,000, and do not fall into any other group.
• D7 - Medium-sized city municipalities: Municipalities with an
urbanization degree exceeding 70 percent, a population between 20,000
and 50,000, and with less than 40 percent of the work force employed
in industry.
• D8 - Suburban municipalities: Municipalities that are suburbs to
big cities, and have a work force where 50 percent commutes to other
municipalities, or 25 percent commutes to big city municipalities.
38A.2 Tables for ﬁgures
Table A1: Persons found guilty of criminal oﬀences,
by principal oﬀence and age, 20001
15-20 21-29 30-49 50- Total
All Crimes 22,775 26,552 51,201 18,175 118,721
All Penal Code Crimes 15,196 11,183 18,201 6,074 50,660
Crimes against Life and Health (ch 3) 2,551 2,051 2,903 748 8,253
Assault (ch. 3 section 5) 2,275 1,771 2,541 625 7,212
Theft, Robbery and
Other Crimes of Stealing (ch. 8)
¾
7,824 5,091 8,728 3,496 25,144
Theft (ch 8 section 1) 2,435 2,014 2,687 330 7,466
Petty Theft (ch 8 section 2) 3,380 1,980 4,978 3,015 13,358
Robbery (ch 8 section 5) 434 188 90 2 714
Vehicle Theft (ch 8 section 7) 993 377 339 19 1,728
Inﬂicting Damage (ch. 12) 1,366 692 605 135 2,798
Drug Crimes 1,569 2,750 3,425 309 8,055
Note: 1) If a person is found guilty of several crimes only the principal oﬀence,
i.e. the oﬀence considered most serious, is recorded. Only district courts judgements
are included. Age at the time of prosecutor decision/summary imposition of ﬁne/judgement.
Chapter and section of the penal code in parenthesis.
Source: the web site of the National Council for Crime Prevention, www.bra.se
39Table A2: Persons suspected of criminal oﬀences, by age, 20001
15-20 21-29 30-49 50- Total2
All Crimes 20,957 19,479 32,836 11,595 84,867
All Penal Code Crimes 16,434 13,253 21,316 6,926 57,929
Crimes against Life and Health (ch. 3) 3,584 2,758 4,229 1,028 11,599
Homicide, Manslaugther, and Deadly
Assault (ch. 3 section 1,2,5,6)
¾
73 106 172 50 401
Assault (ch 3. section 5,6) 3,458 2,611 3,976 920 10,965
Assault against man 2,582 1,756 1,704 305 6,347
Assault against unfamiliar man 1,672 1,296 915 134 4,017
Theft, Robbery and
Other Crimes of Stealing (ch. 8)
¾
9,035 6,567 10,044 3,600 29,246
Burglary (ch. 8 section 1,2,4) 1,565 1,202 1,572 123 4,462
School, Library, Recreation Center, etc. 216 73 78 3 370
Industry, Construction Site, Garage, etc. 375 322 451 36 1,184
Private Houses, Week-end Houses, etc. 385 403 717 52 1,557
Theft and Petty Theft (ch. 8 section 1,2,4) 6,237 5,050 8,540 3,351 23,178
School, Library, Recreation Center, etc 220 28 44 2 294
Industry, Construction Site, Garage, etc 101 201 277 46 625
Auto Theft (ch. 8 section 7) 1,549 903 994 71 3,517
Moped Theft (ch. 8 section 7) 190 48 49 71 625
Robbery, Gross Robbery (ch. 8 section 5,6) 671 359 238 17 1,285
Robbery of Individuals 466 165 108 12 751
Inﬂicting Damage (ch. 12 section 1,2,3) 2,316 1,410 1,873 341 5,939
Graﬃti 473 81 15 0 569
Drug Crimes 2,242 3,821 5,438 425 11,926
Notes: 1) Age at the time of the crime. Chapter and section of the penal code inside parenthesis.
2) For some suspects age is unknown, they are subtracted from the total number of suspects.
Source: the web site of the National Council for Crime Prevention, www.bra.se
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